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We reconsider the empirical links between volatility and growth between 1970 and 2007. There is
a strong and significant correlation between individual country growth rates and global factors that
are arguably exogenous with respect to their economies. The amount of volatility driven by these external
factors is highly correlated, cross-sectionally, with the overall amount of volatility in GDP growth.
There is also a strong correlation between a country's average growth rate and the magnitude and sign
of its exposure to global factors. We interpret our findings as a partial answer to the question "Why
doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?" We argue that low-income countries that grow slowly












alexandra.tabova@duke.eduRamey and Ramey (1995) established that countries with volatile growth tend to have
lower average growth. They studied a panel of 92 countries over the period 1962￿ 85 and found
a statistically signi￿cant negative relationship between the standard deviation of a country￿ s
annual growth rate, and its average growth rate, over the same period. We reconsider the
empirical links between volatility and growth, but in doing so we focus on the e⁄ects of
arguably exogenous global risk factors on relatively small economies. In our benchmark
analysis we consider six factors: US real GDP growth, the ex-post short term real interest
rate in the US, the change in the relative prices of oil and two commodity price indices (for
metals and agriculture), and the US stock market excess return. Our key new ￿ndings are
as follows:
￿ In the time series dimension, there is a strong and signi￿cant correlation between
individual country growth rates and the global factors, but the sign, magnitude and
degree of correlation varies widely across countries.
￿ The degree of volatility for each country predicted by our time series analysis is highly
correlated with the overall level of volatility in each country. Overall we can explain
about 70 percent of the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of GDP growth in
terms of countries￿di⁄ering degrees of sensitivity to aggregate volatility.
￿ Our most novel ￿nding is that there is a strong correlation between a country￿ s average
growth rate and the magnitude and sign of its exposure to aggregate factors. This is
revealed by a cross-sectional regression of average country-speci￿c growth rates on
country-speci￿c factor ￿betas￿ .
Our ￿ndings provide a partial answer to a long-standing question in the macroeconomics
of growth: ￿Why doesn￿ t capital ￿ ow from rich to poor countries?￿As Lucas (1990) argued,
if countries have access to the same constant returns to scale production technology, which
is a function of capital and labor, then if output per worker di⁄ers between the two countries
it must be due to them having di⁄erent levels of capital per worker, which would imply
higher returns to capital in the poor country. If trade in capital goods is free then capital
should ￿ ow from the rich to the poor economy until returns are equated across countries.
This process is instantaneous in the absence of adjustment costs to capital (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2004, p. 163). The notion that returns should be equated across countries, either
instantaneously, or in the long-run, rests on a deterministic view of the world. In contrast,
1in ￿nancial economics, it is common to explain inde￿nitely persistent di⁄erences in rates
of return across assets in terms of di⁄erences in exposure of these assets to aggregate risk
factors. Assets that are more exposed to aggregate risk earn higher average returns. Our
empirical analysis demonstrates that low-income countries (with presumably high returns to
capital) that exhibit surprisingly low growth (relative to the predictions of the neoclassical
model) tend to be more heavily exposed to our measure of global risk. Under the assumption
that our measure of global risk is related to the stochastic discount factor of the relevant
international investors, we can explain, at least partially, why more capital does not ￿ ow to
these countries.
In our sample, when we replicate Ramey and Ramey￿ s benchmark regression, we too
￿nd evidence of a signi￿cant negative association between volatility and growth in the cross-
section. In fact, in our sample, which spans the period 1970￿ 2007 for 107 countries, the
relationship is stronger than in Ramey and Ramey￿ s case. Their benchmark point estimates
imply that for each additional percentage point of volatility, a country￿ s average growth
rate is 0:15 percentage points lower. Our point estimate implies an e⁄ect that is twice as
large: for each additional percentage point of volatility, a country￿ s average growth rate is
0:31 percentage points lower. Apart from the possibility that the magnitude of the e⁄ect
could vary with the time period, we attribute this di⁄erence in magnitude to the fact that
our sample includes more countries that are not high-income members of the OECD. Like
Ramey and Ramey, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of volatility on growth is mainly observed among
low and middle-income countries.
Our estimates of country exposure to global risk factors vary widely in the cross-section,
and for many countries they are statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve or ten percent level. For
example, Mexico has a strong negative and statistically signi￿cant exposure to US interest
rates, and a strong positive and statistically signi￿cant exposure to oil prices. When the
US interest rate is one standard deviation above its mean, holding everything else equal
Mexico￿ s growth rate is about 1:3 percentage points below its mean. When the change of the
relative price of oil is one standard deviation above its mean, holding everything else equal
Mexico￿ s growth rate is about 1:2 percentage points above its mean. The signs of Mexico￿ s
exposure are not surprising given its proximity to the United States and its status as an oil
producer. Chile￿ s real GDP growth, in contrast, is approximately uncorrelated with both
variables. China￿ s exposures have the opposite signs but similar magnitudes. We attribute
2China￿ s signi￿cant negative exposure to oil prices to its status as a large net importer of
energy.
The R2 statistics of our time series regressions are typically quite low (about 0:23),
indicating that the global factors that we have identi￿ed do not account for much of the time
series variation in the typical country￿ s growth rate. Despite this, the degree of exposure to
external factors is signi￿cant in determining which countries have high volatility and which
ones have low volatility. When we run a cross-sectional regression of the standard deviation
of GDP growth on the standard deviation of predicted GDP growth, we obtain an R2 statistic
of 0:70.
The fact that our estimates of country exposure to global risk factors vary signi￿cantly
in the cross-section is crucial to our cross-sectional regression analysis. Absent cross-country
variation in the degree of exposure to global factors we would not be able to identify the
e⁄ects of such exposure on growth. Our results indicate that a country￿ s exposures to US
GDP growth, US interest rates, world oil prices, metals prices and agricultural prices, as
measured by the ￿betas￿in our time series regressions, have a statistically and economically
signi￿cant e⁄ect on a country￿ s average growth rate.1 This suggests that while volatility has
an e⁄ect on economic growth, the e⁄ects of volatility are not necessarily symmetric. As an
example, countries with positive exposure to US interest rate ￿ uctuations grow faster than
countries with negative exposure.
Our results are closely related to a large literature on the e⁄ects of commodity prices
and external shocks in developing countries. This literature has largely studied the dynamic
e⁄ects of commodity prices on economic performance, with parameter restrictions imposed
across countries. Typically the literature has studied the relationship between GDP growth
and other aggregate time series and country-speci￿c export-weighted commodity price se-
ries.2 In e⁄ect, the evidence in the literature is akin to dynamic versions of our time series
regressions, but with cross-country restrictions on the slope coe¢ cients that determine the
1The degree of statistical signi￿cance of some variables changes across speci￿cations of our regressions.
2Deaton and Miller (1995) ￿nd modest evidence that country-speci￿c export-weighted measures of com-
modity prices are positively correlated with growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. Raddatz (2007)
concludes that external shocks (to rich country growth, world interest rates, and country-speci￿c trade in-
dices) are relatively unimportant contributors to volatility in low-income countries. The previous two studies
both use panel regressions that impose common parameters across countries. Dehn (2000) and Dehn and
Collier (2001), measure country-speci￿c ￿extreme￿commodity price shocks, but enter these as explanatory
variables in growth regressions that impose common parameters across countries. They ￿nd signi￿cant
responses to negative shocks, but insigni￿cant responses to positive shocks.
3growth dynamics. Here we eschew examining dynamic responses in favor of identifying
country-speci￿c exposures to common shocks. This allows us to identify long-run e⁄ects of
exposure to shocks on growth using our cross-sectional regressions.
Our empirical methodology owes much to a technique, pioneered by Fama and MacBeth
(1973), that is used in the ￿nance literature to explain cross-sectional variation in expected
returns across ￿rms. Fama and MacBeth take a two step approach to estimating linear factor
models. The ￿rst step is a group of time series regressions of the returns to n portfolios on a
k ￿ 1 vector of aggregate risk factors. The second step is a single cross-sectional regression,
with a sample size of n, of average portfolio returns on the estimated betas. Our approach
mimics Fama and MacBeth￿ s, with country growth rates replacing portfolio returns in the
regressions. In our case, there is no formal asset pricing theory underlying the estimation,
but we are able to exploit the approach in order to correctly compute standard errors for
the cross-sectional regressions given that they use generated regressors. We also provide an
interpretation of our empirical work that relates growth rates, rates of return, and risk.
In Section 1 we revisit the evidence on the links between volatility and growth by re-
examining and extending Ramey and Ramey￿ s (1995) evidence. In Section 2 we consider the
time series relationship between country growth rates and global risk factors. We examine
the strong correlation between a country￿ s overall level of volatility and its volatility due to
external factors. Section 3 introduces our cross-sectional analysis that links average country
growth rates to risk exposures. Section 4 provides the details of how we interpret our ￿ndings
in terms of risk. It also extends our cross-sectional analysis in ways that account for the role
of tranisiton dynamics in explaining growth rates. Section 5 provides some interpretation of
our measure of risk. We show that it is not equivalent to a risk factor de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between average high-income country growth rates and average low-income country growth
rates. It has additional explanatory power. Section 6 concludes.
1 Volatility and Growth Revisited
To begin, we revisit the basic regression in Ramey and Ramey￿ s article. We de￿ne the real
growth rate as git = 100 ￿ ￿lnyit, where yit is per capita GDP measured in constant US
dollars. For each country in our data set, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation
of the real growth rate as gi = 1
T
PT








growth at the annual frequency for 32 high-income countries, and 75 low and middle-income
4countries over the sample period 1971￿ 2007.3 The criterion for inclusion in our data set is
that we must have data for the country over the entire sample period.4 Consistent with the
World Bank de￿nition, a high-income country is one whose gross national income (GNI) per
capita in 2007 exceeded 11,456 US dollars.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the mean growth rate, gi, against the standard deviation
of the growth rate, ￿i, for our full sample. The negative relationship between the two
variables is clear from the graph. When we regress the mean growth rate on the standard






(R2 = 0:20, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses). Our estimate of
the slope coe¢ cient is twice as large as Ramey and Ramey￿ s and has a greater degree of
statistical signi￿cance (our t statistic is 5:2, while Ramey and Ramey￿ s is 2:3). Additional
results are presented in Table 1, for, exclusively, the low and middle-income countries, and the
high-income subsample. Consistent with Ramey and Ramey￿ s ￿ndings, if we only consider
high-income countries the basic relationship between growth and volatility is small and
statistically insigni￿cant. For low and middle-income countries the results are similar to
what we obtain for the full sample.
One pattern that is clear from inspection of Figure 1 is that there are many East Asian
countries with low volatility and high growth, while there are many Sub-Saharan African
and other low-income countries with high volatility and low growth. Indeed, if one includes
dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and East Asia (EAS) in regression (1), the
coe¢ cient on volatility becomes considerably smaller, but it remains statistically signi￿cant,
as indicated in Table 1. We do not view the smaller coe¢ cient as a criticism of regression
(1). High volatility may be an important reason, among others, that growth is low in Sub-
Saharan Africa, while countries in East Asia may have grown faster, in part, due to low
volatility.
A more serious issue is whether regression (1) re￿ ects measurement problems. High
volatility may partly re￿ ect errors in measuring output. If countries with lower growth also
have less accurate statistical data, the relationship between growth and volatility could be
3The list of countries in our sample is provided in the Appendix.
4We eliminated Georgia and Latvia from consideration, even though they appear from 1970￿ 2007 in the
World Bank database. We also eliminate Germany and Kiribati due to German uni￿cation and the split of
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands which both occurred within our sample period.
5spurious. It is hard to know which countries have better data, but one might imagine that
income level is strongly correlated with data quality. With this in mind we include the
logarithm of per capita GDP in 1970, lnyi0, in regression (1). It has no virtually no e⁄ect
on the relationship between growth and volatility, as shown in Table 1. We conclude that
any correlation between measurement error variance and income level does not signi￿cantly
bias the observed relationship between growth and volatility.
Another concern is that using the standard deviation of output growth as a measure of
volatility might focus too much attention on output￿ s high frequency behavior. To address
this concern we also ran a Ramey and Ramey-style regression using the standard deviation of
HP-￿ltered output as our measure of volatility.5 As Table 1 indicates, the negative correlation
between growth and volatility is robust to this alternative.
2 Global Risk Factors and Volatility
We now explore the relationship between global risk factors and economic growth in a subset
that includes 104 of the countries from our original sample. We exclude the United States
and Japan from consideration because they accounted for around 30 and 15 percent of world
GDP, respectively, in 2000. We also exclude Saudi Arabia from the sample because it is by
far the largest oil producer in our sample and a key member of OPEC. We consider six
global risk factors.
1. The growth rate of per-capita real GDP in the United States. We include this factor
as an indicator of global demand conditions. We expect most countries in the sample to
have a positive exposure to this risk factor.
2. The ex-post short term real interest rate in the United States, as measured by the
average 3-month T-bill rate minus the rate of in￿ ation measured using the US Producer Price
Index (PPI). We include this factor as an indicator of the cost of borrowing in international
markets, and, to some extent, liquidity conditions. We expect to ￿nd that most countries
have a negative exposure to this risk factor, as a previous and large body of empirical
work suggests that world interest rates and developing country growth rates are negatively
correlated.6 In small open economy models positive shocks to the world interest rate also
tend to drive down investment and output, although the magnitudes of the e⁄ects depend
5The HP-￿lter is de￿ned in Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
6See, for example, AgØnor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), and Neumeyer and Perri (2004).
6on a country￿ s net foreign asset position.7
3￿ 5. We include the rates of change of three commodity price series relative to US PPI
in￿ ation. The three commodities are crude oil, a primary metals index, and an agricultural
commodity index. We include these series as indicators of possible terms of trade shocks at
the global level. Some countries may be net importers of these commodities, while other may
be net exporters. When countries are net importers of commodities which are used as inputs
into production, a rise in the price of these commodities acts like a negative technology shock
in that ￿rms will respond by reducing their demand for inputs into production. This would
tend to indicate negative exposures for net importers, and, possibly symmetric, positive
exposures for net importers. But other factors come into play as well. Commodity prices
may also acts as indicators of global demand conditions. In this situation rising commodity
prices may be associated with a tendency towards positive exposure for all countries.
6. Finally, we include the excess return to the value weighted United States stock market
as an indicator of ￿nancial conditions. We do not have strong priors as to the sign of the
correlation between this variable and real growth rates in our sample of 104 countries.
Graphs of the time series of our six risk factors are provided in Figure 2. The graphs
indicate that the commodity price indices are highly volatile, and far from perfectly correlated
with each other. They are also not synchronous with the United States-speci￿c variables in
any obvious way. Summary statistics that con￿rm these visual impressions are provided in
Table 2. In all cases, we believe it is reasonable to treat our six global factors as exogenously
determined. All of the countries in our sample accounted for small fractions of world GDP
in 2000.8 Thus we think it is reasonable to take the US growth rate, the US interest rate and
US stock returns as exogenous. While some of the countries in our sample are oil producers,
we think it is arguable that none of them are price setters in the global oil market. Similarly,
while several of the countries in our sample are commodity producers we think it is reasonable
to assume that their individual economies do not have a signi￿cant in￿ uence on our overall
indices of metals and agricultural prices.
7See Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). In a di⁄erent model Mendoza (1991) ￿nds that interest rate
shocks only have modest e⁄ects on economic activity.
8The largest 12 of the 104 countries in our data set accounted for a total of 29 percent of global GDP
in 2000. The remaining countries individually account for less than 1 percent of global GDP, and most are
much smaller than that.
72.1 Time Series Regressions
The ￿rst step in our analysis is a time series regression of each country￿ s real growth rate,
git, on each of the six risk factors, which we denote generically with the scalar ft:
git = ai + f
0
t￿i + ￿it, t = 1;:::;T, for each i = 1;:::;n; (2)
where T = 37 is the sample size in the time dimension, and n = 104 is the sample size in the
country dimension. We estimate the system of 104 equations represented by (3) equation-
by-equation using OLS, and do this separately for each of the six risk factors. Table 3 and
Figure 3 contain summary information regarding the estimated betas (￿i). The median R2 of
the typical time series regression is quite low, ranging from 0:036 when the agricultural price
index is the right-hand side variable, to 0:017 when the US market return is the right-hand
side variable. This means that each of the global factors that we have identi￿ed explains
a modest amount of the variation in GDP growth for individual countries. Figure 3 shows
histograms of the betas for each factor. The frequency of estimates within each bin is
reported, as well as the number of estimates within each bin that are statistically signi￿cant
at the 5 percent level. The graphs and the summary information in Table 3 show that there
is considerable spread in the betas across countries. Betas are also statistically signi￿cant
for a substantial fraction of the countries.
We interpret the betas as measures of a country￿ s exposure to speci￿c risk factors. One
concern, in this regard, is that we could be focusing too much attention on the very high
frequency behavior of output and the various risk factors. To address this concern we also run
time series regressions of HP-￿ltered per capita output, denoted yH
it , on HP-￿ltered versions
of the risk factors, which we denote, generically, as fH
t .9 Let ￿
H
i denote the beta from a
time series regression of yH
it on fH
t . Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of ^ ￿
H
i , the estimated
beta obtained using HP-￿ltered data, against ^ ￿i, the estimated beta from equation (2).10
The scatter plots show that the exposures measured using growth rates are similar to those
obtained using HP-￿ltered data, given that the pairs of estimated betas are clustered close
to the 45 degree line. Therefore, we are con￿dent that what our time series regressions pick
up is not just a high-frequency phenomenon.
9The HP-￿ltered risk factors are the cyclical components of the log-level of real per capita US GDP, the
logarithm of the cumulative real return to holding US treasuries, the logarithm of each of our commodity
price series minus the logarithm of the US PPI and the logarithm of the cumulative excess return to the US
stock market.
10Full summary information on the estimates of ￿
H
i is provided in the Appendix.
8The next step in our analysis is a time series regression of each country￿ s real growth
rate, git, on our 6 ￿ 1 vector of risk factors, which we denote ft:
git = ai + f
0
t￿i + ￿it, t = 1;:::;T, for each i = 1;:::;n: (3)
We again estimate the system of 104 equations represented by (3) equation-by-equation using
OLS.
Table 4 and Figure 5 contain summary information regarding the estimated betas (￿i).
The median R2 of the time series regressions is 0:30, indicating that the global factors that
we have identi￿ed explain a modest amount of the variation in GDP growth for individual
countries.11 Figure 5 shows histograms of the betas for each factor. The frequency of
estimates within each bin is reported, as well as the number of estimates within each bin that
are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The graphs and the summary information
in Table 4 show that there is considerable spread in the betas across countries. Between
roughly 15 and 30 percent of the estimated betas are individually statistically signi￿cant at
the 5 percent level. For 74 of the 104 countries the F-test of the entire regression indicates
statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
There is also economically signi￿cant variation across countries in the size of the betas.
Table 4 gauges the economic signi￿cance of the most extreme beta estimates by scaling them
by the standard deviations of the individual factors. These scaled betas indicate that the
e⁄ects of ￿ uctuations in global factors on economic activity in the most sensitive economies
are quantitatively large.
2.2 Volatility Stemming from Global Factors
Regression (3) allows us to decompose the variance of GDP growth in each country into two









i = ^ ￿
0
i^ ￿f^ ￿i is the sample variance of the predicted values from regression (3), ^ ￿i is
the least squares estimate of ￿i, ^ ￿f is the sample covariance matrix of the vector of factors,
ft, and ￿2
i is the sample variance of the residual from the regression.
11Raddatz (2007) suggests a more modest role for exogenous external shocks. At a forecast horizon of one
year he argues that shocks to exogenous factors explain only 1 percent of GDP growth. One explanation for
this lower R2 (compared to our median R2 of 0:30) is that Raddatz obtains his results by imposing common
slope coe¢ cients in a dynamic panel VAR model. The long-run R2 is 0:11. When he uses a mean-group
estimator that allows for country-speci￿c slope coe¢ cients the long-run R2 rises to 0:24.
9We refer to ￿i as the ￿volatility due to global factors￿and ￿i as ￿overall volatility￿ . The
two measures of volatility, ￿i and ￿i are highly correlated with one another in the cross-
section. Of course, this need not be true by construction. For example, suppose that there
was no spread among the betas across i, so that ^ ￿i = ^ ￿ for all i. Then, obviously, there






As it turns out, the volatility due to external factors can explain about 70 percent of the







(R2 = 0:70, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses). A plot of overall
volatility, ￿i, against the ￿tted values from this regression (Figure 6) shows that countries
with more volatility due to external factors tend to have more overall volatility, and the
relationship is close to linear. If the relationship were exactly linear the dots in Figure 6
would line up perfectly on the 45 degree line. There are four volatile countries that are
obvious exceptions to this pattern: Gabon (GAB), Guinea-Bissau (GNB), Rwanda (RWA)
and the Solomon Islands (SLB).12 It is worth noting that these outliers are not responsible
for the estimated e⁄ect of volatility on growth found in regression (1). If these four countries
are excluded from the regression the results are just as strong, with the slope coe¢ cient
becoming ￿0:36 with a standard error of 0:07.
Finally, we also ￿nd that the point estimate of the slope coe¢ cient in the basic growth-
volatility regression, (1), is robust if we replace actual volatility, ￿i, with predicted volatility






(R2 = 0:10, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses). We think that the
robustness of the point estimate adds to the strength of the results from the basic regression
reported in equation (1). It does not appear that the relationship between volatility and
12At least in the case of Rwanda this is not surprising: its exceptionally high level of volatility is due to
two observations: the 64 log-percent drop in per capita GDP in 1994, during the genocide, and the 31 log-
percent increase in GDP in the subsequent year. Gabon had extremely volatile real growth in the 1970s, and
is highly dependent on oil exports, yet ￿ uctuations in its real GDP do not coincide closely on a year-to-year
basis with the price of oil. Guinea-Bissau su⁄ered a 36 log-percent drop in per capita GDP in 1998 during
a bloody civil war. The Solomon Islands su⁄ered big declines in economic activity during a period of civil
unrest in 2000-01.
10growth is driven entirely by classical measurement error. If it were, then we would expect
the relationship between volatility and growth to disappear once real GDP growth was
projected on external factors using our time series regressions, (3).13
3 Global Risk Factors and Economic Growth
We turn, now, to our main results, which concern the relationship between a country￿ s
exposure to global risk factors and its average growth rate. To identify this relationship we
run a cross-sectional regression of average growth rates on the estimated betas from the time
series regression, (3):
gi = ￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ui, i = 1;:::;n; (7)
where ^ ￿i is the OLS estimate of ￿i obtained in the time series regression, and ui is an error
term. Table 5 presents our estimates of ￿0 and ￿. In computing standard errors for ￿0 and
￿ we take into account the fact that the right-hand side variables in the regression, ^ ￿i, are
generated regressors.14
As Column (1) of Table 5 indicates, we ￿nd that the ￿ coe¢ cients corresponding to three
of our global risk factors are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 or 10 percent level depending
on which correction of the standard errors we adopt. The US real interest rate enters with
a positive sign, while the rates of change of the relative prices of crude oil and metals enter
the estimated equation with negative signs. The cross-sectional R2 is 0:15, indicating that
we can explain 15 percent of the cross-sectional variation in country growth rates using the
spread in the betas, which measure country exposures to the global factors.
In Column (2) of Table 5 we include regional dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and
East Asia in the regression. Although the statistical signi￿cance of our results is somewhat
diminished, the signs and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are quite similar across the two
regressions.
We cannot give ￿ the same structural interpretation that it has in ￿nancial economics.
There, the left-hand side variables are rates of return on di⁄erent assets, so the elements of
￿i can be interpreted as the quantity of each type of risk exhibited in the return to asset i.
13Of course, if errors in measuring GDP were correlated with the external factors then the growth-volatility
link might still be driven by measurement error.
14We present two sets of standard errors. One is based on the correction proposed by Shanken (1992).
The other is a correction proposed by Jagannathan and Wang (1998) that allows for more general forms of
heteroskedasticity. Both corrections are described in detail in Cochrane (2005).
11The elements of ￿ measure the price, or risk premium, associated with each source of risk.
Nonetheless, we think our ￿ndings can be interpreted broadly as linking country growth
rates to risk exposures for reasons we explain in Section 4.
In the case of the US interest rate, the positive ￿ estimate indicates that countries with
more negative exposures to increases in US interest rates grow more slowly, on average, than
countries with positive exposures. Our point estimate for the ￿ associated with US interest
rates is 2:0. The minimum value of the interest rate beta in our sample is ￿0:77 while the
maximum value is 0:65. Taking our point estimates seriously, our cross-sectional regression
predicts a growth rate di⁄erential of 2:9 percentage points for the two countries with these
betas, holding the other betas equal.
In standard small open economy models it would not be surprising to ￿nd that an increase
in US interest rates would lower growth.15 These models can also produce a variety of
sensitivies to interest rate shocks (i.e. spread in the betas), if they are calibrated to allow
for di⁄erent levels of net foreign assets across countries. Countries with more debt would
have more negative betas with respect to interest rates. However, since these models are
usually solved by linear approximation in the the neighborhood of non-stochastic steady
states, they have no implications for average growth rates, which are determined entirely by
the assumed rate of technical progress. One interpretation of our ￿nding is that countries
with more negative exposure to world interest rates are riskier, in a sense that we will make
more precise below. Consequently, they may attract less investment (physical, human and
￿nancial), and grow more slowly. Alternatively, the positive coe¢ cient on interest rates
may be a re￿ ection of debt overhang e⁄ects that are not present in standard models, or
nonlinearities that are not preserved by conventional solution techniques.16
In the case of oil and metals prices we obtain negative ￿ estimates. Countries with more
positive exposures to changes in these commoidty prices grow more slowly, on average, than
countries with negative exposures. Our point estimate for the ￿ associated with oil price
changes is ￿18. The minimum value of the oil price beta in our sample is ￿0:13 while the
maximum value is 0:09. Our cross-sectional regression predicts a growth rate di⁄erential
of 4:0 percentage points for the two countries with these betas, holding the other betas
constant. Our point estimate for the ￿ associated with metals price changes is ￿9. The
minimum value of the oil price beta in our sample is ￿0:14 while the maximum value is 0:35.
15See Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995).
16Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985) provide early analyses of debt overhang related to sovereign debt.
12Our cross-sectional regression predicts a growth rate di⁄erential of 4:4 percentage points for
the two countries with these betas, holding the other betas constant.
In standard open economy models changes in the prices of commodities a⁄ect growth in
two ways. To the extent that the commodities are used in the production of ￿nal goods,
increases in their relative price a⁄ect the producers of ￿nal goods in much the same way as
negative shocks to the production technology. To this extent we would expect negative betas
to emerge from the time series regressions. On the other hand, when commodity production
represents a signi￿cant source of national income, relative commodity price increases induce
positive wealth e⁄ects that expand domestic demand, at least to the extent that the prices
changes do not re￿ ect shocks to the cost of commodity production. Thus, for major com-
modity producers we might expect positive betas to emerge. Nonetheless, as in the case of
interest rates, simple linearized small open economy models do not predict non-zero values
of ￿ in the cross-section. As in the case of interest rates, one interpretation of our ￿nding
is that countries with more positive exposure to oil and metals prices are risky, and there-
fore attract less investment of all kinds. Another possibility is that it re￿ ects the so-called
￿resource curse￿ .17
4 Risk, Returns to Capital and Growth
4.1 International Investors, Risk and Rates of Return
As we alluded to above, one interpretation of our ￿ndings is that countries with more negative
exposures to US interest rates, and more positive exposures to changes in oil and metals
prices, are riskier. We now make more precise what we mean by risky. Suppose there is a
representative international investor who can lend to country i, or can own capital installed
in country i, where i = 1, :::, n. Let the international investor￿ s stochastic discount factor
for payments in constant international dollars received at time t be denoted m￿
t. With no
barries to capital, the following moment condition must hold:
0 = Et(Rit+1m
￿
t+1), i = 1, :::, n: (8)
Here Rit+1 measures the real excess return (over the risk free rate) to investments made in
country i at time t. By the law of iterated expectations, the unconditional version of (8) is
0 = E(Rim
￿), i = 1, :::, n; (9)
17See Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995).
13where we have dropped time subscripts for convenience. We can rewrite the moment condi-
tion, (9), in terms of covariances:
0 = E(Ri)E(m
￿) + cov(Ri;m
￿), i = 1, :::, n: (10)
This means that the di⁄erence between average rates of return across two countries can
be explained by di⁄erences in covariances between rates of return and the international
investor￿ s SDF:
E(Ri) ￿ E(Rj) = ￿[cov(Ri;m
￿) ￿ cov(Rj;m
￿)]: (11)
Equation (11) highlights a key di⁄erence between deterministic and explicitly stochastic
models. In a deterministic model there are no expected values, and no covariance terms.
Rates of return are non-stochastic and equal across countries. Di⁄erences in marginal prod-
ucts of capital can only exist in the presence of adjustment costs or some kind of capital
market friction.
Ideally we would assess whether risk explains di⁄erences in rates of return across coun-
tries by gathering data on rates of return to investment, and estimating an explicit model
of the international investor￿ s stochastic discount factor. Unfortunately we regard this ap-
proach as frought with di¢ culty. We might, for example, assume a Cobb-Douglas production
technology and measure the marginal product of capital in each country and at each point in
time, using assumptions about model parameters and data on output and capital stocks.18
However, if rates of return are inclusive of adjustment costs, we would need to make fur-
ther assumptions about functional forms. Measuring returns to investment in human capital
would be even more di¢ cult. Rather than pursuing an empirical approach explicitly based
on rates of return, we take a di⁄erent approach which is loosely guided by theoretical consid-
erations. Consequently, we do not view our empirical results as providing explicit estimates
of the international investor￿ s stochastic discount factor.
4.2 Growth Rates versus Rates of Return
Our approach is to replace rates of return, in equation (11), with growth rates of per capita
GDP. When doing this we expect the relationship between the objects on the left and right-
18Measure capital stocks is non-trivial. See, for example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare￿ s (1997) analysis
of the neoclassical growth model, in which they measure capital stocks by accumulating investment data in
the Penn World Tables.
14hand sides of (11) to change sign. That is, we expect
E(gi) ￿ E(gj) / cov(gi;m
￿) ￿ cov(gj;m
￿): (12)
How do we come to this conclusion? Recall that the covariances that appear on the right-
hand side of (11) and (12) are time-series statistics. In standard stochastic growth models
rates of return and growth rates of GDP are highly correlated in the time series dimension
because changes in technology and labor inputs (as opposed to the slow-moving changes in
capital inputs) drive the comovements. Improvements in technology and increases in labor
inputs due to other shocks increase growth and the marginal product of capital, and, hence,
the rate of return to investments in capital. Consequently we expect, at a minimum, the
sign of cov(Ri;m￿) to be the same as the sign of cov(gi;m￿).
The sign switch in going from (11) to (12) comes from the left hand side of equation (12).
To arrive at this conclusion, we again derive intuition from the open-economy neoclassical
growth model with adjustment costs. In the deterministic version of the model, if two
countries share the same preferences and technology, and have the same initial capital stocks,
rates of return will be the same in the two countries, and they will grow at the same rate.
Now suppose one country is riskier, in these sense explained above: its rate of return to
capital is more negatively correlated with m￿. Then it will attract less capital, the rate of
return to capital will be higher, and economic growth will be slower. So riskier countries will
grow more slowly and compensate for their riskiness by paying higher returns to capital on
average. Hence we expect and inverse relationship between E(Ri)￿E(Rj) and E(gi)￿E(gj).
One subtle complication in our analysis is that in moving from equation (11) to equation
(12) we lose the equality sign. Since our empirical work e⁄ectively imposes the equality
in (12), we cannot claim to be identifying m￿, but rather, at best, a proxy for it, that we
denote m. A second complication is that the intuition we have just given applies to two
countries with same initial conditions. If transition dynamics driven by countries￿di⁄erent
initial conditions are important, we must somehow take them into account in our empirical
work.
4.3 Taking Transition Dynamics into Account
To take transition dynamics into account we note that in a standard deterministic open-
economy neoclassical growth model with adjustment costs the transition dynamics are linear
15up to a ￿rst order approximation:
git ￿ g ￿ = ￿￿^ yit￿1; (13)
where g is the long-run steady state growth rate, corresponding to the rate of technical
progress, ￿ is a small positive scalar, and ^ yit is the percentage deviation of initial income
from the long-run steady state growth path of output. The steady state growth path of
output can be written as yetg=100, for some constant y. Therefore, we de￿ne ^ yit = 100 ￿
[ln(yit=y) ￿ tg=100]. Given this discussion, we choose to work with a modi￿ed version of git:
^ git = git + ￿^ yit￿1
= git + ￿ ￿ 100 ￿ ln(yit=y) ￿ ￿gt (14)
We set y and g so that the average of ^ yit is zero for the US.19
4.4 Our Implicit Measure of Global Risk
Our implicit measure of risk, is de￿ned in terms of a linear combination of the vector of six
factors: mt = (ft ￿ ￿)
0 b, where ￿ and b are 6 ￿ 1 vector of coe¢ cients and ￿ = E(ft). We
impose the identifying restrictions
E(^ git) = E(￿0 + ^ gitmt), i = 1, :::, n; (15)
where ￿0 is an unknown constant. Since mt is zero mean by construction, the moment
restriction, (15), can be rewritten as
E(^ git) = ￿0 + cov(^ git;mt): (16)
If we consider the di⁄erence in growth rates across two countries, dropping time subscripts
we obtain
E(^ gi) ￿ E(^ gj) = cov(^ gi;m) ￿ cov(^ gj;m); (17)
which is a version of (12) written as an equality, and with gi replaced by ^ gi and m￿ replaced
by m. Of course, mt is, at best, a proxy for the stochastic discount factor of the international
investor, m￿.
19The normalization of y is completely irrelevant to our empirical work because it has no e⁄ect on the
estimated betas. It only a⁄ects the constant in the time series regressions. The choice of g a⁄ects the betas
but a⁄ects them all by amounts that do not vary in the cross-section. Therefore it only a⁄ects the constant
in the cross-sectional regression.
16Given our expression for mt, (16) can, in turn, be rewritten as
E(^ git) = ￿0 + cov(^ git;ft)b: (18)
Finally, (18) can be written in terms of betas and lambdas:
E(^ git) = ￿0 + cov(^ git;ft)￿
￿1

















where ￿ f = 1
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There are three steps in our empirical analysis.
1. Rather than estimate ￿, we consider a range of plausible values, ￿ 2 [0;0:02]. For each
value of ￿ we measure ^ git.
2. For each i = 1;:::;n, we regress, ^ git, on ft:
^ git = ai + f
0
t￿i + ￿it, t = 1;:::;T: (21)
When ￿ = 0 the estimated betas are the same ones we presented in Table 4 and Figure 5.
3. We run a cross-sectional regression of average growth rates on the estimated betas from
the time series regression, (21):
^ gi = ￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ui, i = 1;:::;n; (22)
where ^ gi = 1
T
PT
t=1 ^ git, ^ ￿i is the OLS estimate of ￿i obtained in the time series regression,
and ui is an error term. When ￿ = 0 the estimated elements of ￿ are the same as those
presented in Table 5.
The value of ￿ that maximizes the R2 of the cross-sectional regression is 0:005. One
problem in using the R2 as a criterion for choosing ￿ is that the de￿nition of the left-hand
side variables changes as ￿ changes. If we, instead, use a criterion that judges the models
on how well they ￿t the average unmodi￿ed growth rates, the ￿best￿value of ￿ 2 [0;0:02] is
actually 0. This is not surprising, because over our sample period, the average high-income
17country grew much faster than the average low-income country. Consequently, were we to
estimate ￿, the estimate would be negative. Rather than select a preferred value of ￿ we
present the results for di⁄erent values of ￿ and interpret the R2 of each regression as the
extent to which taking risk into account improves the ￿t of the neoclassical model. We
explain this intepretation in the Appendix.
In Table 6, we present results of estimating the cross-sectional regression with several
values of ￿ 2 [0;0:02]. As before, when ￿ = 0 we see that US interest rates, oil price changes
and metals price changes enter the cross-sectional regression in a statistically signi￿cant way.
The degree of statistical signi￿cance depends on which correction of the standard errors is
used. For larger values of ￿, US GDP growth and agricultural raw materials, which both
enter positively in the cross-sectional regression, begin to become statistically signi￿cant,
while changes in metals prices begin to lose their signi￿cance. Overall, our results suggest
that we can explain about 15 percent of the cross-sectional variation in country growth
rates in terms of these countries￿di⁄ering exposures to global risk factors. While this may
seem like a modest e⁄ect, it is quantitatively signi￿cant compared to benchmark growth
regressions in the literature.20
5 Interpreting our Measure of Risk
5.1 Measuring Risk
Given our estimates of ￿ we can construct the estimated measure of risk given in equation





f ^ ￿. When ^ mt rises it indicates that our proxy for the marginal
valuation of payo⁄s by the international investor goes up. The measures of ^ mt corresponding
to two cases (￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:005) are shown in Figure 7. The variance of the ^ mt series
for ￿ = 0:005 has greater variance, but the two measures of ^ mt are highly correlated with
one another￿ the correlation coe¢ cient being 0:97￿ re￿ ecting the fact that small corrections
for possible transition dynamics do not greatly a⁄ect the estimates of the betas in the time
series regressions. With further increases in ￿, the variance of ^ mt increases further, but the
the general pattern in the variation of ^ mt over time remains similar.
To develop intuition about ^ mt we consider ￿M-betas￿ , that is the regression coe¢ cient
obtained when ^ git is regressed on ^ mt. In population, this coe¢ cient is given by ￿mi =
20For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 522) report R2 of around 0:5 in cross-sectional regressions
over 10 year time periods. Levine and Renelt (1992) report similar results over a 30 year time interval.
18cov(^ gi;m)=var(m). The predicted growth rate of a country is given by (16), so it can also be
written as E(^ git) = ￿0 +￿mi var(m), in population. The variance of mt measures how much
the investor values a unit of risk, while ￿mi measures the riskiness of a country. Countries
with higher values of ￿mi are less risky because their growth rates are more highly correlated
with m. Figure 8 plots average growth rates, relative to the mean across all countries in our
sample, against the M-beta, ^ ￿mi, for the case where ￿ = 0:005. If risk exposure could explain
the entire cross-sectional pattern in growth rates the dots in Figure 8 would line up on the
red line, which corresponds to our estimate of the portion of growth explained by exposure
to risk, ^ ￿
0
i￿ =^ ￿mi^ ￿
2
m.
Risk exposure is highly correlated with initial income. The highest-income countries tend
to have roughly zero M-betas, while below-median-income countries tend to have negative
betas. To illustrate this point, we calculate the M-beta of each country and average these
betas within quartiles of our data set sorted according to average per capita GDP in 1970.
These averaged M-betas are reported in Figure 9, plotted against the average initial income
of each income quartile. The average growth rates (relative to the sample wide average) of
each income quartile are also reported. The graphs show that there is a general pattern of
betas increasing by income, with a similar pattern observed for ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:005. We
also see a pattern of growth being more rapid for the high-income countries. This pattern
becomes sharper as we consider larger values of ￿. The reason is simple. Larger values of
￿ imply faster transition dynamics, and these, in turn, imply larger downward growth-rate
adjustments for poor countries. That is, since ^ git ￿git = ￿^ yit￿1 is more negative the lower is
a country￿ s income level, it becomes more sharply related to income for larger values of ￿.21
5.2 Sorted Factors and Portfolios
In our sample period high-income countries (de￿ned by per capita GDP in 1970) have grown
faster than low-income countries. In this section we investigate whether our measure of risk,
^ mt, is equivalent to risk factors created by sorting our 104 countries by income and forming
￿portfolios￿by income group, or whether it has additional explanatory power. In forming
our new risk factors, we mimic the common practice in the ￿nance literature of sorting ￿rms
by characteristics that appear to be systematically associated with rates of return, and then
21Of course, there are exceptions to these patterns. For example, Botswana, whose per capita income was
$425 in 1970, has grown very rapidly, at an annual pace of 6:5 percent. But it is also exceptional in being a
low-income country with a large M-beta.
19creating risk factors by grouping ￿rms with similar characteristics.22 We also investigate
whether ^ mt and our new income-based risk factors can explain the cross-sectional variation
in a set of 26 income-sorted portfolios.
We construct our income-based risk factors in two ways. To construct our ￿rst factor,
we sort the 104 countries in our data set into two groups of 52 countries, ordered by initial
income in 1970. In each time period, we average the growth rates of the countries within
the high-income and low-income categories. Our constructed risk factor, which we refer to
as the SHL (static high-income minus low-income) factor, is the di⁄erence between these
average growth rates.
To construct our second factor, in every year, t, we sort the 104 countries in our data set
into two groups of 52 countries, ordered by income in the previous year, t ￿ 1. We compute
the di⁄erence between the average growth rates of these two groups of countries and refer
to it as the DHL (dynamic high-income minus low-income) factor. In the second approach
there is some change in the content of the two portfolios over time.
We construct two sets of income-sorted portfolios in an analogous way. The ￿rst set of
26 portfolios is constructed by sorting the 104 countries in our data set into 26 groups of
4 countries, ordered by initial income in 1970. In each time period, each portfolio growth
rate is the simple average of the growth rates of the countries within that portfolio. Since
the identity of the countries in each portfolio is ￿xed over time, we refer to these as ￿static￿
sorted portfolios. The second set of 26 portfolios is constructed by, in each time period,
sorting the 104 countries in our data set into 26 groups of 4 countries, ordered by income
in the previous time period. Again, the portfolio growth rate is the simple average of the
growth rates of the countries within that portfolio. Since the identity of the countries in
each portfolio varies over time, we refer to these as ￿dynamic￿portfolios.
As our results in Table 7 indicate, the SHL and DHL factors are able to explain substantial
fractions of the cross-sectional variation in average growth rates within our sample. This
is true for our original 104-country sample, but is also true for the 26 static and dynamic
sorted portfolios. Our measure of risk from Section 5.1 (measured using ￿ = 0), denoted ^ m,
also has signi￿cant explanatory power for the di⁄erent sets of growth rates.
In Table 8, we ask whether our measure of risk, ^ m, has explanatory power that goes
22A classic example is Fama and French (1993), where ￿rms are sorted on the basis of size (market
capitalization) and the ratio of book value to market value, and the constructed risk factors are the average
return di⁄erentials between the small and big ￿rms, and high book-to-market and low book-to-market value
￿rms.
20beyond picking up the variation in growth rates that is explained by SHL and DHL. We
estimate two factor models that pair ^ m together with SHL and DHL. Our results indicate
that in all cases, ^ m has signi￿cant explanatory power in the cross-section over and above
that provided by the SHL or DHL factors. This suggests that ^ m is not just picking up
whatever factors explain the observation that high-income countries have grown faster than
low-income countries since 1970. It is actually able to explain variation in growth rates
within these groups. Together, the ^ m and DHL factors can explain 78 percent of the cross-
sectional variation of the growth rates of the 26 dynamically-sorted portfolios. This case is
also illustrated in Figure 10, where we compare model-predicted growth rates (the predicted
values in the cross-sectional regression) with average growth rates in the data. Given the ￿t
of this model, we think additional research into the economic factors underlying the DHL
variable will be fruitful for explaining, further, why low-income countries have grown more
slowly that high-income countries since 1970.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have reconsidered the empirical links between volatility and growth, with
a focus on the role of arguably exogenous global risk factors. We have shown that there
is a strong relationship, over time, between individual country growth rates and US GDP
growth, US interest rates, growth rates of three commodity price series and US stock returns,
but that this relationship varies across countries. We have shown that countries with greater
exposures to these factors also display more overall volatility in GDP growth. Ramey and
Ramey￿ s (1995) result that more volatile countries grow slower is robust to replacing the
volatility of GDP growth with the volatility of GDP growth explained by exogenous global
factors. This suggests that global risk factors play an important role in the link between
volatility and growth.
Our most important result is that there is a strong correlation between a country￿ s
average growth rate and the magnitude and sign of its exposure to aggregate risk factors.
This is revealed by a variety of cross-sectional regressions of average country-speci￿c growth
rates on country-speci￿c factor ￿betas￿ . A long-standing question in macroeconomics is
￿Why doesn￿ t capital ￿ ow from rich to poor countries?￿Our results suggest that part of the
answer is that low-income countries are ￿riskier￿ .
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23Appendix
Data Sources Our measure of real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars is taken
from the World Development Indicators database. We measure the US real interest rate
as the di⁄erence between the 3 month T-bill rate (from the International Financial Statis-
tics [IFS] database) and the rate of in￿ ation of the US producer price index (PPI) (from
the IFS database). We obtained the oil, metals, and agricultural products price indices
from the IFS database, and converted them to relative prices using the US PPI. The ex-
cess return on the US stock market was taken from the Fama/French factors ￿le available
at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Rates of
change were measured as log ￿rst di⁄erences multiplied by 100. Our country list is found in
Table A1.
Interpreting the R2 Statistic Denote the predicted values of ^ gi in the cross-sectional
regression as ^ g
p
i = ^ ￿0+^ ￿
0




Therefore the predicted values for the original growth rates are g
p
i = ^ g
p
i ￿ ￿^ yi. The R2
measured in terms of modi￿ed growth rates is
R
2 = 1 ￿
Pn




i=1(^ gi ￿ ^ g)2
where ^ g = 1
n
Pn
i=1 ^ gi. Letting ￿ g = 1
n
Pn
i=1 gi, the R2 measured in terms of unmodi￿ed growth
rates is
~ R






i=1(gi ￿ ￿ g)2 :
Since gi ￿ g
p
i = ^ gi ￿ ^ g
p
i the ~ R2 is related to R2 according to
~ R
2 = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ R
2)
Pn
i=1(^ gi ￿ ^ g)2
Pn
i=1(gi ￿ ￿ g)2:
A cross-sectional regression with no risk terms has predicted values equal to ^ g for all i and
an R2 of 0. Therefore, its alternate R2 is
~ R
2
no risk = 1 ￿
Pn
i=1(^ gi ￿ ^ g)2
Pn
i=1(gi ￿ ￿ g)2:
Comparing the ￿t of the models with and without risk terms we see that
~ R
2 ￿ ~ R
2
no risk = R
2
Pn
i=1(^ gi ￿ ^ g)2
Pn
i=1(gi ￿ ￿ g)2
Thus, the improvement in ￿t in terms of unmodi￿ed growth rates is proportional to the R2
of the cross-sectional regression in terms of modi￿ed growth rates.
24TABLE A1: Country List
Australasia & Paci￿c Latin Amer. & Caribbean South Asia
Australia￿ Argentina Bangladesh
Fiji Belize India
New Zealand￿ Bolivia Nepal
Papua New Guinea Brazil Pakistan
Solomon Islands Chile Sri Lanka
East Asia Colombia Sub-Saharan Africa
China Costa Rica Benin
Hong Kong￿ Dominican Rep. Botswana
Indonesia Ecuador Burkina Faso
Japan￿y El Salvador Burundi
Korea￿ Guatemala Cameroon
Malaysia Guyana Central African Rep.
Philippines Haiti Chad
Singapore￿ Honduras Congo, Dem. Rep.
Thailand Jamaica Congo, Rep.
Europe Mexico C￿te d￿ Ivoire
Austria￿ Nicaragua Gabon
Belgium￿ Panama Gambia, The
Denmark￿ Paraguay Ghana
Finland￿ Peru Guinea-Bissau
France￿ St. Vincent & the Gren. Kenya
Greece￿ Trinidad & Tobago￿ Lesotho
Hungary￿ Uruguay Liberia
Iceland￿ Venezuela Madagascar





Netherlands￿ Saudi Arabia￿y Rwanda
Norway￿ Syria Senegal
Portugal￿ Tunisia Seychelles
Spain￿ North America Sierra Leone
Sweden￿ Bahamas￿ South Africa
Switzerland￿ Bermuda￿ Sudan
Turkey Canada￿ Swaziland
United Kingdom￿ United States￿y Togo
Zambia
￿ Indicates a high-income country as designated by the World Bank.
y Indicates a country not included in our analysis of global factors, but included in our growth
and volatility regressions.
25TABLE 1: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Average Growth Rates on Volatility
Right-hand side variables
Constant Volatility Regional dummies Initial Income R2
SSA East Asia



























B) Regressions with income-based subsamples










Notes: Annual data, 1971￿ 2007. The table summarizes results of estimating cross-sectional regressions of average growth rates
of real per capita GDP on volatility, and other variables. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of
real per capita GDP, except in the one case indicated, where it is measured as the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of the logarithm of real per capita GDP, as de￿ned by the HP-￿lter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The full list of countries
is provided in the Appendix, along with the delineation by income category and region. Initial income is measured as the
logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1970. Real GDP is measured in constant (2000) US dollars.
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6TABLE 2: Summary Statistics for Risk Factors
Standard Deviations
US growth US interest rate Oil price Metals prices Agricultural prices US market return
1:90 4:39 28:1 16:9 10:4 17:0
Correlation Matrix
US growth US interest rate Oil price Metals prices Agricultural prices US market return
US growth 1 0:11 ￿0:11 0:29 0:39 ￿0:02
US interest rate 0:11 1 ￿0:65 ￿0:32 ￿0:25 0:21
Oil price ￿0:11 ￿0:65 1 0:26 0:13 ￿0:33
Metals prices 0:29 ￿0:32 0:26 1 0:58 ￿0:09
Agricultural prices 0:39 ￿0:25 0:13 0:58 1 ￿0:41
US market return ￿0:02 0:21 ￿0:33 ￿0:09 ￿0:41 1
Notes: Annual data, 1971-2007. The table provides summary statistics for the six risk factors described in more detail in the
main text: US GDP growth, the US real interest rate, the rates of change of the relative prices of oil, metals, and agricultural
products, and the excess return to the US stock market. For the US interest rate and the US market return the units of the
standard deviations are in percentage points. For the other variables they are percent changes.
2
7TABLE 3: Time Series Regressions of Individual Country Growth Rates on Individual Risk Factors
Beta Estimates Scaled Beta Number of Statistically Median
Minimum Median Maximum Estimates Signi￿cant Betas R2
(￿min) (￿med) (￿max) ￿min ￿ ￿f ￿max ￿ ￿f 5% level 10% level
US growth ￿1:22 0:21
(0:34)
2:31 ￿2:32 4:39 25 32 0:029
US interest rate ￿0:76 ￿0:12
(0:13)
0:54 ￿3:33 2:36 30 41 0:035
Oil price ￿0:07 0:02
(0:02)
0:08 ￿2:00 2:18 19 31 0:021
Metals prices ￿0:09 0:03
(0:04)
0:23 ￿1:50 3:83 27 34 0:030
Agricultural prices ￿0:21 0:04
(0:05)
0:42 ￿2:18 4:31 37 48 0:036
US market return ￿0:16 ￿0:00
(0:04)
0:15 ￿2:80 2:58 5 10 0:017
Notes: Annual data, 1971￿ 2007. The table summarizes results of estimating the time series regressions described in the note to
Figure 3. Summary information about the estimated ￿s across the 104 countries in our data set is presented. The median of
the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors is presented in parentheses below the median estimate of ￿.
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8TABLE 4: Time Series Regressions of Individual Country Growth Rates on the Vector of Risk Factors
Beta Estimates Scaled Beta Number of Statistically
Minimum Median Maximum Estimates Signi￿cant Betas
(￿min) (￿med) (￿max) ￿min ￿ ￿f ￿max ￿ ￿f 5% level 10% level
US growth ￿1:25 0:23
(0:32)
2:63 ￿2:38 5:01 24 31
US interest rate ￿0:77 ￿0:12
(0:16)
0:65 ￿3:36 2:84 23 29
Oil price ￿0:13 0:00
(0:02)
0:09 ￿3:65 2:59 12 21
Metals prices ￿0:14 0:01
(0:04)
0:35 ￿2:33 5:89 13 20
Agricultural prices ￿0:57 0:02
(0:07)
0:35 ￿5:91 3:62 24 31
US market return ￿0:14 0:01
(0:04)
0:21 ￿2:30 3:64 14 19
Notes: Annual data, 1971￿ 2007. The table summarizes results of estimating the time series regressions described in the note to
Figure 5. Summary information about the estimated ￿s across the 104 countries in our data set is presented. The median of
the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors is presented in parentheses below the median estimate of ￿.
2
9TABLE 5: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Average Country Growth Rates
on Betas with respect to Global Risk Factors



















































Notes: In column (1) we present the results of estimating cross-sectional regressions of the
form, gi = ￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ui, i = 1;:::;n, with n = 104. Here gi is the average growth rate
of a country in the period 1971￿ 2007, and ^ ￿i is a 6 ￿ 1 vector of estimated betas from the
time series regressions described in the note to Figure 5. The betas measure the exposure of
country i￿ s growth rate with respect to six risk factors: US GDP growth, the US real interest
rate, the rates of change of the relative prices of oil, metals, and agricultural products, and
the excess return to the US stock market. Standard errors that correct for estimation of
the betas are presented below the point estimates: Shanken (1992) standard errors are in
parentheses; Jagannathan and Wang (1998) standard errors are in brackets. Column (2)
presents a similar regression in which we add dummy variables for whether a country is
located in Sub-Saharan Africa or East Asia.
30TABLE 6: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Modified Growth Rates on Betas
with respect to Global Risk Factors
Right-hand side variables ￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:005 ￿ = 0:01 ￿ = 0:015 ￿ = 0:02


























































































R2 0:149 0:164 0:159 0:150 0:141
Notes: We present the results of estimating cross-sectional regressions of the form, ^ gi =
￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿+ui, i = 1;:::;n, with n = 104. Here ^ gi is the average growth rate of a country in
the period 1971￿ 2007 modi￿ed to take into account transition dynamics (see the main text),
and ^ ￿i is a 6 ￿ 1 vector of estimated betas from the time series regressions described in the
note to Figure 4. The parameter ￿ determines the magnitude of the correction for transition
dynamics. The betas measure the exposure of country i￿ s modi￿ed growth rate with respect
to six risk factors: US GDP growth, the US real interest rate, the rates of change of the
relative prices of oil, metals, and agricultural products, and the excess return to the US stock
market. Standard errors that correct for estimation of the betas are presented below the
point estimates: Shanken (1992) standard errors are in parentheses; Jagannathan and Wang
(1998) standard errors are in brackets.
31TABLE 7: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Growth Rates on Betas with re-
spect to Our Measure of Risk and Income-Sorted Factors
104 countries 26 portfolios 26 portfolios
static sorting dynamic sorting






















R2 0:15 0:21 0:21 0:29 0:27 0:27 0:70
Notes: We present the results of estimating cross-sectional regressions of the form, gi =
￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ui, i = 1;:::;n, where n is either 104, when gi represents the growth rate of an
individual country, or 26, when gi represents the average growth rate of four countries in a
portfolio. Portfolios are constructed by sorting countries on the basis of initial income. In
the case of ￿static sorting￿countries are sorted on the basis of their per capita income in
1970. In the case of ￿dynamic sorting￿countries are sorted in each year, on the basis of
their per capita income in the previous year. The right-hand side variable in the regressions
is ^ ￿i which is the slope coe¢ cient in a time series regression of git on a risk factor, ft. We
consider three risk factors: ^ m, the measure of risk de￿ned in section 5.1 (assuming ￿ = 0),
the SHL factor (the average growth rate of high-income countries minus the average growth
rate of low-income countries, with high and low-income de￿ned in terms of a sort on the
basis of 1970 per capita income), the DHL factor (the average growth rate of high income
countries minus the average growth rate of low income countries, with high and low income
de￿ned in terms of a sort that evolves continuously within the sample). Standard errors that
correct for estimation of the betas are presented below the point estimates: Shanken (1992)
standard errors are in parentheses; Jagannathan and Wang (1998) standard errors are in
brackets.
32TABLE 8: Bivariate Cross-Sectional Regressions of Growth Rates on Mul-
tivariate Betas with respect to Our Measure of Risk and Income-Sorted
Factors
104 countries 26 portfolios
static dynamic
Factors: ^ m & SHL ^ m and DHL ^ m & SHL ^ m & DHL
























R2 0:23 0:24 0:33 0:78
Notes: We present the results of estimating cross-sectional regressions of the form, gi =
￿0 + ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ui, i = 1;:::;n, where n is either 104, when gi represents the growth rate of an
individual country, or 26, when gi represents the average growth rate of four countries in a
portfolio. See the note to Table 7 for details of the sorting. The right-hand side variable in
the regressions is ^ ￿i which is the vector of slope coe¢ cients in a time series regression of git
on a pair of risk factors, ft. We consider the three risk factors described in the note to Table
7: ^ m, the SHL factor, and the DHL factor. Standard errors that correct for estimation of
the betas are presented below the point estimates: Shanken (1992) standard errors are in
parentheses; Jagannathan and Wang (1998) standard errors are in brackets.
33FIGURE 1: Growth versus Volatility, 1971￿ 2007



































































































































Note: The graph shows a scatter plot of the mean growth rate, gi, against the standard
deviation of the growth rate, ￿i using annual data over the period 1971￿ 2007. Data sources,
series de￿nitions, and country labels are described in the Appendix.
34FIGURE 2: Measures of Global Risk Factors
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 US Market Return
%
Note: Annual data, 1971-2007. The graphs provide show time series data for the six risk
factors described in more detail in the main text: US GDP growth, the US real interest rate,
the rates of change of the relative prices of oil, metals, and agricultural products, and the
excess return to the US stock market.
35FIGURE 3: Estimates of the Betas for Individual Risk Factors










































































































Note: The graphs summarize information obtained from time series regressions of each
country￿ s real growth rate, git, on individual risk factors, ft, using annual data over the
period 1971￿ 2007. Each regression takes the form git = ai + f0
t￿i + ￿it. The risk factors
are US real GDP growth, the ex-post short term real interest rate in the US, the change
in the relative prices of oil, metals and agricultural products, and the US stock market
excess return. The countries, series de￿nitions and data sources are described in detail in
the Appendix.
36FIGURE 4: Growth Rate Based and HP-Filter Based Betas for Individual
Risk Factors
































































































































Note: The graphs are scatter plots of estimates of the ￿growth rate beta,￿￿i, described
in the note to Figure 3, against estimates of the ￿HP Filter-based beta,￿￿
H
i , described in
the main text, which is the slope coe¢ cient from a time series regression of each country￿ s
HP-￿ltered log level of per capital real GDP, yH
it , on HP-￿ltered log levels of the individual
risk factors, fH
t , using annual data over the period 1971￿ 2007. The data are described in







data are described in more detail in the note to Figure 3.
37FIGURE 5: Estimates of the Betas for the Vector of Risk Factors















































































































Note: The graphs summarize information obtained from time series regressions of each
country￿ s real growth rate, git, on a 6 ￿ 1 vector of risk factors, ft, using annual data over
the period 1971￿ 2007. Each regression takes the form git = ai + f0
t￿i + ￿it. The risk factors
are US real GDP growth, the ex-post short term real interest rate in the US, the change
in the relative prices of oil, metals and agricultural products, and the US stock market
excess return. The countries, series de￿nitions and data sources are described in detail in
the Appendix.
38FIGURE 6: Overall Volatility and Volatility Predicted by Exposure to Risk




































Note: The graph is a scatter plot of the standard deviation of each country￿ s growth rate
(overall volatility), against the degree of volatility predicted by its exposure to external
shocks. The latter is computed from the regression of ￿overall volatility￿ , ￿i, on volatility
due to external factors, ￿i, described in the text. Sample: 1971￿ 2007. Sources are described
in the Appendix.
39FIGURE 7: Our Measure of the Proxy for the International Investor￿ s Level
of Risk














f ^ ￿ where ft is the vector of risk factors
described in the note to Figure 5, ￿ f is the mean of that vector, ^ ￿f is its sample covariance
matrix and ^ ￿ is an estimate of the slope coe¢ cients in the cross-sectional regression described
in the note to Table 6. The sample period is 1971￿ 2007. The parameter ￿ determines the
size of the correction made to the growth rate data to take into account transition dynamics.
40FIGURE 8: Average Modified Growth Rates against M-Betas















































Note: For each country, the M-beta is the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of its modi￿ed





f ^ ￿, described in the note
to Figure 7. The modi￿ed growth rates are measured using ￿ = 0:005 and the correction
described in the main text. Average growth rates for each country are expressed relative to
the cross-sectional average of all countries￿growth rates.
41FIGURE 9: M-Betas and Growth Rates versus Income

















































Note: For each country, the M-beta is the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of its modi￿ed





f ^ ￿, described in the note
to Figure 7. The modi￿ed growth rates are measured using ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:005 and the
correction described in the main text. Average growth rates for each country are expressed
relative to the cross-sectional average of all countries￿growth rates. Countries are sorted by
per capita real GDP in 1970 and grouped into quartiles. The x-axis in each graph shows the
average initial income level of each quartile, while the vertical axis shows either the average
M-beta or the average growth rate within that income quartile.
42FIGURE 10: Actual Average Growth Rates and Model-Predicted Growth
Rates for the 26 Dynamically Sorted Portfolios






























Notes: The diagram shows average growth rates plotted against model-predicated growth
rates for the dynamically sorted portfolios describes in the text and the note to Table 7. The
model uses ^ m and DHL as risk factors. These factors are also described in the note to Table
7.
43